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COMMENTS 
Funded Adoption: A "Viable" Alternative 
to Abortion 
Since 1973, when the United States Supreme Court decided 
Roe u. Wade1 and thus "legalized" ab~rtion,~ the simple expedi- 
ent of elective abortion has become the popular method of mas- 
tering an otherwise awkward situation-unwanted pregnancy. It 
is impossible to estimate the number of American women who 
accept the medical, social, and financial risks of both carrying to 
term a pregnancy characterized as "unwanted" and then keeping 
the child, for better or worse. Nevertheless, when motherhood is 
not chosen, abortion is far more common than adoption-the 
usual solution of an earlier generati~n.~ 
Even if a woman has justifiable reasons for rejecting the 
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
2. Roe u. Wade held that the power of the state to regulate abortion through criminal 
statutes is limited by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. This limitation 
is greatest during the first trimester of pregnancy, when a woman's right of privacy, 
including the right to terminate her pregnancy upon consultation with her physician, 
cannot be overridden by the state. As the pregnancy enters the second trimester, the 
state's interest in promoting the health of the mother becomes compelling and regulations 
reasonably related to protecting maternal health will be upheld. When the fetus finally 
reaches the stage of viability, the state's interest in protecting the potential human life 
becomes compelling, and the state may regulate or even prohibit abortions, except those 
medically necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother. Id. at 164-65. 
3. The number of legal abortions performed in the United States in 1977 was esti- 
mated at 1.3 million. Forrest, Tietze, & Sullivan, Abortion in the United States, 1976- 
1977, 10 FAM. PLAN. PERSPECTIVES 271, 272 (1978). Since 1973 the number of abortions in 
the United States has risen steadily. Over five million abortions were performed between 
1973 and 1977. Id. 
According to an official from the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
(HEW), there were about 150,000 adoptions in 1973, the most recent year for which fairly 
accurate data are available. Opportunities for Adoption Act of 1977: Hearings on S. 961 
Before the Subcomm. on Child and Human Development of the Senate Comm. on Human 
Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1977) (statement of Saul Rossoff, Acting Director, 
Office of Child Development, HEW) [hereinafter cited as S. 961 Hearings]. The figures 
provided by HEW do not distinguish adoptions of newborn "unwanted" infants from 
adoptions of other categories of children. More detailed data are available on adoptions 
in 1971 and 1972. See Adoption and Foster Care, 1975: Hearings Before the Subcomm. 
on Children and Youth of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 94th Cong., 
1st Sess. 591-618 (1975) (data collected by HEW) [hereinafter cited as Adoption and 
Foster Care Hearings]. 
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heavy responsibilities of motherhood, she may find it difficult to 
embrace the modern alternative. To her, abortion may seem a 
repugnant and desperate course. Still, in a society oriented to- 
ward the simple and expedient, abortion has the advantage of 
being a very pragmatic solution. To further weight the scales in 
its favor, abortion is cheap relative to the high cost of pregnancy 
and childbirth. For the woman with limited financial means, the 
expensive alternatives may seem hopelessly remote, and abortion 
looms as the only feasible option. As the field of alternatives 
narrows, this woman, often without a supportive partner or fam- 
ily, may fear that a struggle against the insistent pressure of 
circumstances pushing her toward abortion would be foolish or 
financially disastrous. For the unexpectedly pregnant indigent 
woman, economic reality is a harsh and insensitive dictator. 
Legislative and judicial complications have seriously dis- 
torted the economic factors involved in the choice between abor- 
tion and the alternatives of motherhood or adoption. The pendu- 
lum of the law has swung both ways. The upswing came shortly 
after Roe v. Wade, when states began to pay the costs of elective 
abortions for indigent women, usually with federal funding under 
Medicaid programs.' Within four years of Roe u. Wade nearly all 
states paid for nontherapeutic abortions for Medicaid-eligible 
women.5 In 1976 more than $60,000,000 from Medicaid and other 
social services programs helped fund over a quarter-million abor- 
tions.' But as the pendulum returned, this generous source of 
funds was severed. Amendments to the 1977, 1978, and 1979 con- 
gressional appropriations to the Department of Health, Educa- 
tion, and Welfare (HEW) have cut off all federal funds adminis- 
tered by HEW that would otherwise go to pay for nontherapeutic 
abortions.' In addition, in Maher u. Roe, the Supreme Court held 
4. The Medicaid statute, title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396- 
139613 (1976), does not specifically require or prohibit the use of federal program funds for 
abortions. Rather, it lists general categories of medical services that must be provided by 
a participating state, permitting the state to limit or expand coverage within these general 
categories. See note 72 infra; Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 444 (1977). 
5. See 5 FAM. PLAN./POPULATION RPTR. (AGI) 11 (1976) (only four states did not 
provide Medicaid assistance for elective abortion as  of Feb. 1976); 3 FAM. 
PLAN./POPULATION RPTR. (AGI) 113 (1974) (1974 study reported only ten states that re- 
stricted Medicaid for elective abortion). 
6. 6 FAM. PLAN./POPULATION h. (AGI) 59 (1977). 
7. Department of Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare Appropriations Act, 
1979, Pub. L. No. 95-480, 4 210, 92 Stat. 1567 (1978); Continuing Appropriations, 1978, 
Pub. L. No. 95-205, 4 101,91 Stat. 1460 (1977); Department of Labor and Health, Educa- 
tion, and Welfare Appropriation Act, 1977, Pub. L. No. 94-439, $209,90 Stat. 1418 (1976). 
These amendments prohibit the use of appropriated HEW funds for abortions except 
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that a state can constitutionally refuse to provide funding for 
nontherapeutic abortions even though federal funds might be 
available, and even though the state pays the cost of therapeutic 
abortion or normal childbirth for eligible women? After the 
Maher decision and Congress' funding cutoff, many states imme- 
diately followed the federal example.1° 
It has been strongly argued that the cutoff of public funding 
of elective abortions will have a serious detrimental effect on 
indigent women.ll The initial pressure of economic reality will 
easily extinguish hopes of attempting motherhood or adoption. 
Furthermore, in many cases a low-income woman will be unable 
even to scrape together enough cash for a private abortion. 
Charitable institutions, if available, may provide help. But 
without public or charitable support, economic pressure may 
further violate the freedom of choice of a poor woman by forcing 
her to submit to the physical and psychological dangers of 
illegal, but cheap, "back alley" abortion12 or "black market" 
- -- 
when the life of the mother is endangered. The 1978 and 1979 amendments also allow 
funding in reported cases of rape or incest, or when serious physical health damage to the 
mother would otherwise result. 
The 1977 amendment (Hyde amendment) was enjoined from taking effect by Federal 
District Judge John F. Dooling shortly after it became law. McRae v. Mathews, 421 F. 
Supp. 533 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), vacated and remanded sub nom. Califano v. McRae, 433 US.  
916 (1977). The Supreme Court vacated and remanded to the district court after its 
decisions in Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), and companion cases, see note 123 and 
accompanying text infra, for reconsideration in light of these new decisions. Califano v. 
McRae, 433 US.  916 (1977). Thereafter, Judge Dooling.issued a temporary restraining 
order, which he eventually dissolved on Aug. 4, 1977, ruling that the Hyde amendment 
would go into effect as soon as the Secretary of HEW issued regulations defining the 
parameters of the abortion funds cutoff. McRae v. Califano, 6 FAM. PLAN./POPULATION 
RPTR. (AGI) 58 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 1977). 
HEW issued the required regulations, which were finalized after the Dec. 9, 1977, 
passage of the 1978 appropriations amendment. 43 Fed. Reg. 4570 (1978) (to be codified 
in 42 C.F.R. $6  50.301-.310, 441.200-.208; 45 C.F.R. 8 228.92). 
8. 432 U.S. 464 (1977). 
9. Id. at 470, 480. 
10. See 6 FAM. PLAN./POPULATION RPTR. (AGI) 58 (1977). Within a few months of the 
Maher decision, a majority of states had stopped payments for elective abortion. Id. In 
addition, several states began legislative consideration of state bans on elective abortion 
funding. See 7 FAM. PLAN./POPULATION RPTR. (AGI) 10 (1978). Illinois became the first 
state to' enact such a law following Maher. Act of Nov. 17, 1977, P.A. 80-1091, 8 1, ILL. 
ANN. STAT. ch. 23, 8 5-5. (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979). 
11. See, e.g., Beal v. Doe, 432 US.  438, 455 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 
462 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Lincoln, Doering-Bradley, Lindheim, & Cotterill, The 
Court, the Congress and the President: Turning Back the Clock on the Pregnant Poor, 9 
FAM. PLAN. PERSPECTIVES 207 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Lincoln]; Note, A Right With- 
out Access? Payment for Elective Abortions After Maher v. Roe, 7 CAP. U.L. REV. 483 
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Right Without Access?]. 
12. Before Roe u. Wade, abortions performed by physicians were illegal in most 
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adoption,13 the only two "alternatives" remaining. 
Opponents of the ban on publicly funded abortion thus raise 
the spectre of widespread back alley abortion to frighten Congress 
and the states into resurrecting funded elective abortion for poor 
women.14 Such a return to the previous state of affairs would tend 
to alleviate part of the problem for indigent women who view 
states. In the post-Roe v. Wade era, however, "illegal abortion" refers to the procedure 
when performed by one other than a licensed physician. An illegally performed abortion 
presents a much greater degree of danger to the woman because of uncontrolled, often 
inadequate, medical care. Increased mortality from self-induced abortions, or abortions 
performed by illegal abortionists, is likely. See Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 455 n.1 (1977) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting); Lincoln, supra note 11, at 213; Right Without Access?, supra 
note 11, a t  493. 
Illegal abortions will presumably be less expensive than legal abortions obtainable in 
the same area, simply as a matter of market competition. See 432 U.S. at 455 n.1 (Mar- 
shall, J., dissenting). 
13. "Black market" adoption generally involves profiteering on the part of a 
"brokerw-often an attorney or a physician-who contacts a pregnant woman interested 
in placing her child for adoption. The broker also locates a couple hoping to adopt, usually 
a couple that has been discouraged and unsuccessful at attempts to adopt through author- 
ized agencies. The couple must be willing to pay cash, often many thousands of dollars, 
to obtain a child. The broker handles the actual adoption arrangement. Although his "fee" 
generally covers all medical and living expenses of the mother, plus any court costs, the 
wolfs share is retained by him "for services." See generally Adoption and Foster Care 
Hearings, supra note 3, at 26-36 (joint statement of Joseph H. Reid, Executive Director, 
Child Welfare League of America, Inc., and Elizabeth S. Cole, Director, North American 
Center on Adoption Special Project, Child Welfare League of America, Inc.); Article, 
Black Market Adoptions, 22 CATH. LAW. 48 (1976). 
Black market "babyselling," while not always illegal, presents a difficult moral and 
ethical problem. This is especially true since parents who adopt through the black market 
have usually failed in earlier attempts to adopt through authorized agencies, often because 
they lack suitability for the role of adoptive parents. See Adoption and Foster Care 
Hearings, supra note 3, a t  32 (joint statement of Joseph H. Reid, Executive Director, Child 
Welfare League of America, Inc., and Elizabeth S. Cole, Director, North American Center 
on Adoption Special Project, Child Welfare League of America, Inc.). 
Black market adoption should be distinguished from "independent" adoption place- 
ment, often referred to as "gray market" adoption. Independent adoption is placement 
arranged outside agency channels, either by the mother herself, or perhaps by her clergy- 
man, lawyer, or physician. The element of profiteering is absent. The adoptive parents 
may have to provide some of the incidental expenses, such as reasonable lawyer's fees, or 
in some cases a portion of the mother's medical expenses, but these costs are small when 
compared to the cost of a black market adoption. Independent adoption may not provide 
effective screening for suitability of potential adoptive parents, but being well- 
intentioned, it does not suffer from the immoral and unethical taint of the b l y k  market. 
See generally Grove, Independent Adoption: The Case for the Gray Market, 13 V u .  L. 
REV. 116 (1967). 
14. See, e.g., 124 CONG. REC. H5357-59 (daily ed. June 13, 1978) (remarks of Rep. 
Mikulski and Rep. Holtzman); Lincoln, supra note 11, at 213; Right Without Access?, 
supra note 11, at 490, 493. 
Another possible "spectre" for the pro-funding advocates could be black market 
babyselling-an obvious, even profitable alternative for a desperately poor pregnant 
women. 
FUNDED ADOPTION 
abortion as an acceptable solution to unwanted pregnancy. But 
it would do nothing to help those financially limited women who 
are morally opposed to abortion. For these women, there may be 
no realistic alternatives. The subtle force of the societal, and 
perhaps institutional, bias15 in favor of the simplicity and expe- 
diency represented by abortion tugs insistently. But when swelled 
by the often severe economic pressure pushing inexorably in the 
direction of illegal abortion and black market adoption, this force 
becomes overwhelming. 
It is the purpose of this Comment to suggest an acceptable 
alternative for women caught between the societal and institu- 
tional pressure simply to terminate an unwanted pregnancy in 
abortion, and the sometimes intense economic pressure that may 
ultimately force them into black market adoption or illegal abor- 
tion. The alternative is publicly funded adoption. Such a pro- 
gram would cover the expenses of prenatal, natal, and postpar- 
tum care for the woman; infant health care; counseling and refer- 
ral services; and all costs of adoption, including in selected cases 
subsidies to adoptive parents. For low-income women, the total- 
ity of these costs might preclude adoption as a reasonable alterna- 
tive to abortion. But with public financial assistance, adoption 
may be the ideal solution for many women.16 Administered and 
supported by federal and state agencies and private organiza- 
tions, adoption could serve to counterbalance any abortion bias. 
Furthermore, it would make illegal abortion the costly choice and 
black market adoption unnecessary and senseless. Funded adop- 
tion would thus provide the acceptable alternative to abortion 
15. Of course, such an institutional bias is extremely elusive and difficult to substan- 
tiate. The orientation of a specific agency or organization will naturally tend to reflect the 
local climate-rural or urban, religious or eclectic, conservative or liberal. However, evi- 
dence of this bias at the federal level is suggested in a statement by Connie J. Downey, 
Director of Women's Action Program, HEW, that the literal alternatives to abortion are 
suicide, motherhood, and madness. Abortion Alternatives Cited in HEW Memo, 
Washington Post, Nov. 27, 1977, a t  A-2, col. 1 (quoting an internal memo from Ms. 
Downey to HEW Secretary Joseph A. Califano, proposing the disbanding of an HEW task 
force she headed to research alternatives to abortion). 
On the other hand, the recent cutoff of public funding for abortion at both federal 
and state levels may evidence a trend away from a pro-abortion bias, at least by institu- 
tions that are politically responsive. However, the regulations issued by HEW implement- 
ing the cutoff of federal funds are quite liberal in defining the "rape or incest" and the 
"physical health of the mother" exceptions to the funding ban. See 43 Fed. Reg. 4570 
(1978). See also 124 CONG. REC. H5368-70 (daily ed. June 13, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Hyde 
and Rep. Michel). 
16. Effective family planning may, of course, be a better solution than either abortion 
or adoption. However, the focus here is on those situations in which pregnancy is already 
a reality-situations that for lack of prevention must seek after the cure. 
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which motherhood, in a woman's personal circumstances, may 
not. 
This Comment will discuss several important considerations 
bearing on legislative implementation of the funded adoption al- 
ternative. Section 11 details the concepts and components of a 
complete and effective funded adoption program. Section I11 out- 
lines the current stance of Congress with regard to the need for 
abortion alternatives, and in particular discusses enacted and 
proposed legislation that has involved the funded adoption alter- 
native. Section IV examines existing laws and social services pro- 
grams that presently provide, or have the capacity to provide, 
funded adoption services. Finally, Section V briefly discusses 
some additional issues of significance to a decision to enact a 
funded adoption program-notably cost, difficulties of imple- 
mentation, and constitutionality. 
Funded adoption, as advocated by this Comment, would be 
most workable as a state-administered program, financed in large 
part through federal matching grants. A new title or subtitle to 
the Social Security Act1' could serve as the legislative vehicle to 
provide federal financial participation and congressional policy 
guidelines. The Secretary of HEW would be responsible for im- 
plementation and specific regulation in disbursement of federal 
funds to qualified state programs. Private nonprofit organizations 
with qualified programs could also be eligible for federal funds. 
States and private organizations would have discretion to tailor 
the details of their programs to suit local needs, but the basic 
federal pattern would need to include four essential components: 
(1) counseling and referral services, (2) maternal health care, (3) 
infant health care, and (4) adoption subsidy. 
A. Counseling and Referral 
The f i t  necessary component of funded adoption is a re- 
fined counseling and referral network. Counseling services would 
be the contact point for a woman seeking assistance under a 
funded adoption program, perhaps upon referral from another 
entity, such as her clinic or physician or another social services 
organization. Once a woman gains access to the counseling net- 
work, she would be guided smoothly and comfortably through the 
17. 42 U.S.C. fig 301-1397f (1976). 
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entire program. In this regard it is very important to safeguard 
against any tendency the program might have to overrule the 
choices and personal values of the individual. Statutory or regula- 
tory language, therefore, should require counseling staffs to dis- 
close full details of the program, including the fact that receipt 
of benefits imposes no obligation to participate fully in the pro- 
gram or follow through with the adoption.In Misunderstanding on 
this point could seriously damage the value of the entire pro- 
gram.lTounseling must inform the woman of available benefits, 
yet allow and encourage her to use her own judgment in deciding 
whether to accept the alternative of funded adoption. In the event 
she decides against the adoption alternative, the woman should 
be guided out of the program and referred to other sources of 
assistance where appropriate. 
Counseling, available also to the woman's partner or family, 
would be necessary to all stages-from initial contact with the 
program, through pregnancy, childbirth, and the adoption pro- 
cess. After adoption, the emphasis would shift to the adoptive 
family. An integrated counseling system would provide both con- 
tinuity and the comfort of familiarity to program participants, 
and would thus be vital to the overall effectiveness of the pro- 
gram. 
In conjunction with the counseling system, an adoption refer- 
ral network would also be necessary. Locating suitable adoptive 
parents, the function of this network, would be greatly facilitated 
if a nationwide computer referral network were deve l~ped .~~  A 
state, while administering the program within its own bounda- 
ries, would be able to draw from a national pool in matching 
adoptive parents to child-no easy task considering the diversity 
18. This type of "disclosure" caveat was included in S. 961, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 9; 
103(a)(2), 123 CONG. REG. S17872 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1977) [hereinafter cited as S. 9611, 
a Senate proposal that in several respects resembles funded adoption as advocated by this 
Comment. See notes 44-50 and accompanying text infra. Provision of services under the 
Senate proposal would occur only after the woman has "been informed in writing that the 
acceptance of such services does not in any way constitute an obligation to proceed with 
adoption." S. 961, supra, 5 103(a)(2). 
19. The supporters of the S. 961 proposal, see note 18 supra, also feared such a 
misunderstanding. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 167, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 40-41, reprinted in 
[I9781 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1029, 1057-58 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. NO. 95- 
1671; S. 961 Hearings, supra note 3, at 101 (statement of Mathew Ahman, Associate 
Director, National Conference of Catholic Charities); id. at 163-64 (statement of National 
Urban Leaguehnteragency Adoption Project). 
20. Provision for implementing such a nationwide, computer-based system is found 
in title II of the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment and Adoption Reform Act of 1978, 
42 U.S.C.A. $ 5113(b)(3) (Supp. 1979). 
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of factors, such as familial background, race, and health, that are 
generally considered in the adoption process. 
Together, the counseling and referral systems would function 
to correlate the various components of the funded adoption pro- 
grams, provide ready access to its benefits, and ensure comforta- 
ble transition through the stages of the program. An efficient 
counseling and referral network, in order to fulfill these purposes, 
must be appropriately funded, adequately staffed, and provided 
with full access to all centrally promulgated guidelines and infor- 
mation. 
B. Maternal Health Care 
Without public or charitable assistance, a low-income 
woman may be foreclosed from the adoption alternative simply 
because she or her family cannot afford the doctor bills. Costs of 
maternal health care are high,ll and the possibility of complica- 
tions makes the financial risks much greater. A poor woman's 
only route to adoption, if she is to escape these costs, may lead 
through the black market. Thus, an essential element of funded 
adoption is the provision of all pregnancy-related expenses, in- 
cluding the costs of prenatal, natal, and postpartum care.12 
Funded adoption would be most effective if financial assis- 
tance for maternal health care were authorized and administered 
directly through the program. The temptation would be strong to 
simply cross over to one or more of the various existing medical 
assistance programs, such as Medicaid," as a ready source of 
funds. For the sake of maintaining the integrated and compre- 
hensive nature of the funded adoption alternative, however, a 
new framework for maternal health care assistance should be set 
up, with eligibility requirements and other control aspects based 
on the specific purposes of the funded adoption program. 
21. See The Cost of Having a Baby, 1978, GOOD HOUSEKEEPING, Jan. 1978, at 170. This 
article gives a regional breakdown of hospital, physician, and other normal pregnancy and 
delivery medical expenses. Total average costs range from $924 (midwife delivery, New 
York City) to $2520 (hospital delivery, Boston). The average cost nationwide is about 
$1300-1500. 
22. Although the major pregnancy-related expenses are medical, provision for further 
incidental expenses, such as nutritional care, maternity wardrobe, and childbirth training 
would also be appropriate. Additionally, pregnancy may make it difficult or impossible 
for a woman to continue in a particular employment, especially in later months. In such 
cases, the provision of "pregnancy disability" benefits might lessen the impact of this 
income impairment. 
23. For a discussion of some of these alternative sources of funding for maternity care, 
see notes 73-76, 91-94 and accompanying text infra. 
FUNDED ADOPTION 
C. Infant Health Care 
If adoption is planned, but adoptive parents are not readily 
available, the significant costs of newborn infant care are nor- 
mally paid by the natural parent or parents until adoption can 
finally be arranged. These immediate costs can become a finan- 
cial burden on a low-income woman and her family. 
The burden of infant care is compounded drastically in the 
event of health complications. For example, intensive care for a 
premature baby could cost much more than an uninsured, 
average-income family could afford, and would be an impossible 
expense for low-income parents." Congenital or early-developing 
health defects could also severely tax natural parents' financial 
resources. 
Funded adoption should provide assistance that meets the 
expenses of child health carez5 in order to remove a significant 
economic barrier to the adoption alternative. The same appara- 
tus that disburses maternal health care assistance could operate 
to provide infant health care. Again, already existing alternative 
sources of funds may prove tempting,26 but the same argument 
mentioned in regard to maternal health care applies. In order to 
be comprehensive, a funded adoption program must be self- 
sustaining, depending on no collateral program for any of its es- 
sential component services. 
D. Adoption Subsidy 
Funding of the actual adoption process involves two types of 
expenses. The first type consists of nonrecurring expenses, nota- 
bly court costs, attorney fees, and agency fees.27 Usually these 
24. In an attempt to reduce costs and increase availability of specialized care for 
high-risk pregnancies and premature infants, an experiment in regionalization of perinatal 
centers and neonatal intensive care units (ICU's) is currently underway in parts of the 
. 
United States. Helping Hand for the Newborn, TIME, Sept. 11, 1978, a t  93. Nevertheless, 
"a newborn's stay in an intensive care unit can run into tens of thousands of dollars." Id. 
A study of 75 premature infants (1000 grams or less) admitted to the Neonatal ICU a t  
Cedars-Sinai Medical Center in Los Angeles showed average total cost for non-surviving 
infants to be $14,236, while average total cost for surviving infants was $40,287. Pomer- 
ance, Ukrainski, Henderson, Nash, & Meredith, Cost of Living for Infants Weighing 1,000 
Grams or Less at Birth, 61 PEDIATRICS 908, 909 (1978). 
25. Child health care benefits, in addition to specific medical expenses, should in- 
clude routine newborn and developing-infant care (for example, immunization and well- 
baby checkups, diapers and clothing, nutritional care, and day care). In extreme cases, 
provision could also be made under this heading for basic support costs (food and shelter). 
26. For a discussion of some alternative sources of funding for child health care, see 
notes 74, 91-94 and accompanying text infra. 
27. The total amount of these nonrecurring expenses varies, depending on the type 
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costs are assigned to the adoptive parents, and program funding 
of these one-time expenses would serve the purposes of funded 
adoption by removing this economic obstacle when it proved sig- 
nificant for a particular adoptive couple. 
The second type of expense includes the child support ex- 
penses borne by the adoptive parents. Although these costs, as 
well as the nonrecurring expenses, are not a direct economic bur- 
den to the natural mother or family, the indirect effect-possible 
difficulty in finding adoptive parents with sufficient financial 
resources-may serve as a deterrent to the adoption alternative. 
As discussed in greater detail in Section IV,28 the purposes of a 
direct adoption subsidy to the adoptive parents are to create a 
larger pool of potential adoptive parents and to ensure that all 
children, despite special needs, handicaps, or other factors tend- 
ing to discourage prompt placement, will be adopted as soon as 
possible. Selective adoption subsidyn would allow couples with 
lower incomes, but great desire and parental ability, to adopt." 
Subsidies would be especially useful in alleviating the extra cost 
burden on adoptive parents imposed by the special needs, medi- 
cal or otherwise, of some children. Adoption subsidies cannot 
substitute for love, but they can meet physical needs that loving 
adoptive parents might not otherwise be able to provide.31 
The importance of adoption subsidy becomes clear when it 
is observed that adoptive placement of minority children may be 
of adoption and the state where it occurs. Public agency adoption costs average from $200- 
400; private agency, from $450-900; independent, from $1600-3400; and international, 
from $850-1300. J. MCNAMARA, THE ADOPTION ADVISOR 109-10 (1975). 
28. See notes 99-101 and accompanying text infra. 
29. Adoption subsidy would be selective in the sense that only some of the funded 
adoption situations would include this final component, In the majority of cases adoption 
could be accomplished without program subsidy because the newborn infant would be in 
demand. Adoption subsidy would only be implemented as needed to ensure adoption in 
unusual cases, particularly those where the infant has special medical or other needs. 
30. More than three-fourths of all nonrelative adoptions (those not by stepparents or 
other relations) in the United States are arranged by public or private adoption agencies. 
Adoption and Foster Care Hearings, supra note 3, at 592, 596; J. MCNA~~ARA, supra note 
27, a t  45. Agencies have requirements for potential adoptive parents that include such 
factors as age, marital status, health, religion, and financial status. J. MCNAMARA, supra 
note 27, at 51-56. Although financial requirements were often prohibitive for low- and 
middle-income families in the past, the recent trend emphasizes the ability of adoptive 
parents to manage well what they do have, rather than their specific income or wealth. 
Id. a t  53, 103. In part, this trend toward flexibility in fmancial requirements for adoption 
is a result of state adoption subsidies. Id. at 53-54. 
31. There is no element of profit in adoption subsidy. The subsidy would cover only 
those expenses of the child that the adoptive parents could not afford. An example would 
be extreme medical expenses incurred from operations to correct a birth defect such as a 
cleft palate. 
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more difficult than placement of Caucasian children." Subsidies 
would facilitate the adoption of minority children by expanding 
the pool of adoptive parents to include more minority group cou- 
p l e ~ . ~ ~  Hopefully, the inclusion of adoption subsidy as a compo- 
nent of funded adoption would inhibit any tendency of the pro- 
gram to be of less benefit to minority groups, who may be most 
in need of the adoption a l t e rna t i~e .~~  
Adoption subsidy is thus essential to an integrated program 
of funded adoption because it ensures that children with special 
medical or other needs, or minority children, will be readily 
adopted. Without this assurance that her child will be adopted 
by suitable, loving parents regardless of health, race, or other 
factors, a woman may be unwilling to consider the funded adop- 
tion alternative. 
E. Possible Additional Components of Funded Adoption 
Funded adoption essentially benefits low-income women, 
those who are most susceptible to economic pressure to submit, 
against their moral and ethical scruples, to legal or illegal abor- 
-- - - -  
- - - - 
32. Healthy nonwhite infants are not as difficult to place as they once were. See J. 
MCNAMARA, supra note 27, at 35-37. However, nonwhite children with physical handicaps 
or other special needs are not readily adoptable. See Adoption and Foster Care Hearings, 
supra note 3, at 438-43 (statements of Evelyn K. Moore, Executive Director, Black Child 
Development Institute, and Alfred B. Herbert, Jr., Adoption Project Director, Black Child 
Development Institute). Furthermore, minority awareness groups have recently come to 
consider transracial adoption inappropriate, largely because it tends to denigrate a child's 
racial heritage. See J .  MCNAMARA, supra note 27, at 37-38. See generally Adoption and 
Foster Care Hearings, supra note 3, at 438 (statement of Evelyn K. Moore, Executive 
Director, Black Child Development Institute). Because of the resultant hesitancy on the 
part of agencies to arrange transracial placements, the bulk of minority child adoptions 
must occur within minority communities. Recently developed black adoption programs 
have had some success in placing black children with black families. See id. a t  440; 
Neilson, Tayari: Black Homes for Black Children, 55 CHILD WELFARE 41 (1976) (San Diego 
Adoption Services program, Tayari, established to provide greater outreach to black com- 
munity to increase adoption of black children). Nevertheless, there is still a great need 
for more adoptions within the minority communities. See S. %l Hearings, supra note 3, 
a t  159-60 (statement of National Urban Leaguehteragency Adoption Project); Haring, 
Adoption Trends: 1971 -1 975, 55 CHILD WELFARE 501, 501-02 (1976); Haring, Adoption 
Trends, 1971-1974, 54 CHILD WELFARE 524, 524-25 (1975). For a general discussion of the 
problems encountered in transracial adoption, see J. MCNAMARA, supra note 27, at 35-39; 
Katz, Transracial Adoption: Some Guildelines, 53 C H ~ D  WELFARE 180 (1974). 
33. See Katz, Subsidized Adoption in America, 10 FAM. L.Q. 3, 5 (1976). See gener- 
ally S. 961 Hearings, supra note 3, at 158, 164 (statement of National Urban League/ 
Interagency Adoption Project). 
34. See Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438,459-60 & nn.3 & 4 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting); 
Forrest, Tietze, & Sullivan, Abortion in the United States, 1976-1977, 10 FAM. PLAN. 
PERSPECTIVES 271, 274-75 (1978) (abortion rates highest among nonwhite, poor, and un- 
married). 
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tion or to black market adoption. Some of the benefits of funded 
adoption, however, could be extended to a broader group of 
women. The costs associated with childbirth and adoption in 
reality may fall more heavily on middle-income women, who may 
be ineligible for public or charitable aid available to those with 
lower incomes. Therefore, it  might be appropriate to provide 
some of these women with maternal and child health care bene- 
fits. The total cost of the program would increase as more women 
were included within eligibility limits; but such an expanded 
program would attract those women who could easily afford the 
cost of private abortion, yet who as a matter of conscience would 
prefer an inexpensive alternative. 
Counseling and referral services could be made universally 
available, if for no other reason than to encourage informed choice 
among abortion and the alternatives, particularly adoption. In 
addition, nationwide adoption referral would benefit if children 
from all groups, not just from lower income groups, were included 
in the pool of adoptable children. Enlarging the total pool of both 
children and potential adoptive parents increases the likelihood 
of early matching of parents to child. 
Finally, a complete in-state funded adoption program could 
be financed and administered by a state itself, without federal 
financial participation or regulation. It would simply require allo- 
cation of resources at the state level. The four basic components 
of the program would be included, possibly with provision for 
tapping into a wider regional or national pool of children and 
adoptive parents.35 
Resisting any ostrich-like instinct, Congress has not hidden 
its head in the sand at first sight of looming controversy in the 
shape of demands for alternatives to abortion. Rather, in magpie 
fashion, raiding various camps, Congress has gathered a nest-full 
of programs that it hopes will provide safe haven from inclement 
political weather. While these efforts provide some makeshift se- 
curity for those members of Congress concerned with tempest in 
the constituency, these enacted or proposed programs are less 
effective as solid support for those women faced with the reality 
of the need for alternatives to abortion. Nevertheless, legislative 
35. The foundation for establishing such a national pool of children and adoptive 
parents has ben established in title 11 of the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment and 
Adoption Reform Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C.A. 9 5113, (Supp. 1979). 
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attempts to ameliorate the problem are encouraging, and contin- 
ued efforts by Congress are essential to an ultimate solution. 
The only actual enactment by Congress in response to the 
problem is title I1 of the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment 
and Adoption Reform Act of 1978." While this Act is more specifi- 
cally directed at  overcoming barriers to adoption of hard-to-place 
children than a t  establishing an alternative to ab~rtion,~'  its 
value in making adoption a more attractive and effective alterna- 
tive should not be underestimated. 
The new Act (1) directs the Secretary of HEW to appoint an 
advisory panel to study model adoption legislation and report 
specific legislative proposals," (2) grants HEW the authority to 
establish an administrative arrangement to coordinate all federal 
adoption and foster care services,3g (3) authorizes the establish- 
ment of a nationwide, computer-based adoption information ex- 
change system,& (4) establishes an education and training pro- 
gram for dissemination of adoption assistance information," and 
finally, (5) funds a study, to be reported to Congress, on black 
market adoption. 42 
These various provisions of the Act do much to focus both 
congressional and administrative energies on adoption problems. 
The Act recognizes the need for coordinated national action to 
overcome barriers to adoption arising because of differing state 
laws." It encourages counseling programs and nationwide adop- 
tion referral, with control of both resources and information cen- 
tered in a single administrative entity. Most importantly, it an- 
ticipates further congressional action after the authorized studies 
have been completed. 
Despite the valuable contributions of the Adoption Reform 
36. 42 U.S.C.A. $ 0  5111-5115 (Supp. 1979). 
37. "It is . . . the purpose of this title to facilitate the elimination of barriers to 
adoption and to provide permanent and loving home environments for children who would 
benefit by adoption, particularly children with special needs . . . ." Id. 8 5111. See 124 
CONG. REc. S5334-35 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Cranston). 
38. 42 U.S.C.A. 8 5112 (Supp. 1979); 124 CONG. REc. S5335 (daily ed. Apr. 12,1978) 
(remarks of Sen. Cranston). 
39. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5113(a) (Supp. 1979); 124 CONG. REC. S5335 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 
1978) (remarks of Sen. Cranston). 
40. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5113(b)(l), (3) (Supp. 1979); 124 CONG. REC. 85335 (daily ed. Apr. 
12, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Cranston). 
41. 42 U.S.C.A. 4 5113(b)(2) (Supp. 1979); 124 CONC. REc. S5335 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 
1978) (remarks of Sen. Cranston). 
42. 42 U.S.C.A. 8 5114 (Supp. 1979); 124 CONG. REc. S5335 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 1978) 
(remarks of Sen. Cranston). 
43. 42 U.S.C.A. 8 5111 (Supp. 1979); S. REp. NO. 95-167, supra note 19, at 17-20. 
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Act, it  is in some ways a disappointment. Certain major provi- 
sions of the original legislation, S. 961," were not included in the 
bill as passed by Congre~s .~~ These provisions would have given 
grants to the states (1) to establish comprehensive adoption assis- 
tance programsM and (2) to provide "pre-natal, natal, and post- 
partum services to women who are voluntarily planning to place 
their children for ad~ption"~~-women who might otherwise have 
"no alternative other than [to] resort to abortion or to accept 
assistance from black market profiteers. "48 This second provision 
of S. 961, which would have set up "a clear alternative to abortion 
and black market adoption,"49 was dropped in the Senate amend- 
ments to the House bill and ostensibly transferred by its sponsors 
to other pending adoption reform legi~lation.~~ 
Other, more comprehensive; adoption reform legislation was 
introduced but not acted upon by the 95th Congre~s.~'  H.R. 
7200,52 entitled the Public Assistance Amendments of 1977, would 
have set up an entire system of adoption assistance. The bill 
would have provided federal matching funds for use by states in 
adoption subsidy programss3 and would have increased federal 
financial participation in other adoption-related child welfare 
- - - - - - - - - 
44. 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. S17872 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1977). 
45. The House and Senate finally agreed on amendments to H.R. 6693, the House 
version of S. 961. H. R. 6693--Joint Explanatory Statement of House Bill, Senate Amend- 
ment, and Compromise Agreement, 124 CONG. REC. S5335-37 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 1978), 
reprinted in [I9781 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1084, 1084-89. 
46. S. 961, supra note 18, 8 103. 
47. Id. $ 103(a)(2). 
48. S. REP. NO. 95-167, supra note 19, at 40. 
49. Id. 
50. 124 CONG. REC. S5333 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Cranston); 123 
CONG. REC. S17875 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Cranston). Unfortunately, 
this significant provision of S. 961 thereby disappeared into the shadowy realm of congres- 
sional committee deliberation. 
51. The 95th Congress adjourned Oct. 15, 1978, allowing certain adoption-related 
bills to expire. It can only be hoped that similar bills will be reintroduced in the 96th 
Congress. To date, several bills regarding adoption subsidy have been introduced in the 
96th Congress. See, e.g., H.R. 1291, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (adoption subsidy); S. 
966, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (adoption assistance). 
52. 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. H5805 (daily ed., June 14, 1977) (House 
version); H.R. 7200,95th Cong., 1st Sess., as reported by S .  REP. NO. 573,95th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1977) (Senate version) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 7200, Senate version]. 
. 53. See S. REP. NO. 573,95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2,22-23 (1977) (Senate version); H.R. 
REP. NO. 394, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 64-65 (1977) (House version); Public Assistance 
Amendments of 1977: Hearings on H.R. 7200 Before the Subcomm. on Public Assistance 
of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 108-09 (statement by HEW Secre- 
tary Joseph A. Califano, Jr. concerning administration proposal) [hereinafter cited as 
H. R. 7200 Hearings]. 
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services.54 The overall goal of the adoption reform measures of 
H.R. 7200 was to redirect federal money and emphasis away from 
foster care assistance and toward adoption assistance." 
Two other bills introduced in the 95th Congress, S. 26W6 and 
H.R. 12400,57 were specifically aimed at  establishing programs to 
provide alternatives to abortion. S. 2614 proposed to rechannel 
family planning program funds to provide more emphasis on 
abortion alternative programs." Although this legislation would 
not fund adoption expenses directly, it would provide counseling 
and referral services that emphasized adoption possibilities. 
H.R. 12400 proposed a much more comprehensive abortion 
alternative program. The bill anticipated federal financial partic- 
ipation in programs providing maternity health care benefits for 
adolescent mothers, health care for their infants, and special 
adoption services in these cases.59 It also proposed a full range of 
adoption assistance, including subsidy, to all groups." Some de- 
gree of program funding of maternity-related expenses for all 
women planning to use the adoption alternative would have been 
provided." Also, the bill included research grants to promote 
effective abortion alternative programs," income tax benefits to 
encourage adoption,63 and criminal sanctions for black market 
profiteering. 64 
H.R. 12400 is similar to the funded adoption program advo- 
cated by this Comment. The other legislative efforts are more 
limited in scope than is H.R. 12400 in terms of establishing com- 
prehensive funded adoption, yet the refined contributions of 
these other proposals may have some advantage over the blunder- 
54. See S. REP. NO. 573, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 29, 33-34 (1977) (Senate version); 
H.R. REP. NO. 394,95th Cong., 1st Sess. 52-56 (1977) (House version); H.R. 7.00 Hearings, 
supra note 53, at 109-10 (statement by HEW Secretary Joseph A. Califano, Jr. concerning 
administration proposal). 
55. H. R. 7200 Hearings, supra note 53, a t  57-62 (statement of Joseph A. Califano, Jr., 
Secretary, HEW). 
56. 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. S2652-53 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1978) 
[hereinafter cited as S. 26141. 
57. 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 124001. 
58. S. 2614, supra note 56, § 3. See 124 CONG. REC. S2652 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1978) 
(remarks of Sen. Helms). 
59. H.R. 12400, supra note 57, at § 202. 
60. Id. § 303. This section of H.R. 12400 is similar to S. 961, supra note 18. 
61. H.R. 12400, supra note 57, sec. 303(b), 4 1802(a)(2). Cf. S. 961, supra note 18, § 
lO3(a) (2) (provision in S. 961 of maternity-related services to women voluntarily planning 
to use adoption alternative). 
62. H.R. 12400, supra note 57, §§  202, 303. 
63. Id. § 301. 
64. Id. 8 302. 
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buss approach of H.R. 12400. For example, the H.R. 7200 adop- 
tion subsidy program is much more complete than the H.R. 12400 
proposal." The ideal legislative response would combine the com- 
prehensiveness of H.R. 12400, and its focus on abortion alterna- 
tives, with certain strong, finely tuned components patterned 
after the relevant proposals of S. 961, H.R. 7200, S. 2614, and the 
Adoption Reform 
IV. EXISTING LAW-A MAKESHIIT REMEDY 
Existing social services programs at  both state and federal 
levels presently provide, albeit in a disconnected fashion, much 
of the specific assistance necessary for the funded adoption alter- 
native. Yet there is no clear legislative intent that these diverse 
programs be considered a direct response to the need for alterna- 
tives to aborti~n.~' Furthermore, the availability and impact of 
these separate services vary from state to state. For these reasons, 
the overall value of existing programs as providers of funded 
adoption services is diminished. 
These various programs can be classified into two general 
groups. The first includes federally funded, state-administered 
social services-titles XIX and XX of the Social Security Act,6n 
for example. Although these programs differ somewhat from state 
to state, all generally provide some direct assistance to the eligi- 
ble woman and child in an adoptive situation. The second group, 
on the other hand, is more concerned with facilitating the adop- 
tion process itself. These assistance programs derive from adop- 
tion subsidy laws now in effect in the great majority of states. 
65. Compare H.R. 7200, Senate version, supra note 52, sec. 101, §§ 470-476 with H.R. 
12400, supra note 57, sec. 303(b), Q 1802. The H.R. 7200 adoption assistance program 
includes express statutory guidelines in such areas as parent income requirements, contin- 
ued Medicaid eligibility for the adopted child, and disbursement and amount of matching 
funds. Also, important terms such as "child with special needs" are defined in detail. On 
the other hand, H.R. 12400 leaves many of the details and much of the guideline-setting 
to HEW or the individual states. 
66. Some of these specific proposals are: maternity health care, see S. 961, supra note 
18, $ 103(a)(2); adoption subsidy, see H.R. 7200, Senate version, supra note 52, sec. 101, 
§§ 470-476; counseling on alternatives to abortion, see S. 2614, supra note 56, Q 3(a); 
funding of alternatives-to-abortion projects, see id. 3(b); and nationwide computerized 
adoption referral services, see 42 U.S.C.A. 8 5113 (Supp. 1979). 
67. For examples of programs with legislative intent directed at alternatives to abor- 
tion, see S. 2614, supra note 56, Q  2; H.R. 12400, supra note 57. 
68. 42 U.S.C. $ 5  301-1397f (1976). 
FUNDED ADOPTION 
A. Federally Funded Programs 
1. Title XIX of the Social Security Act-Medicaid 
Title XIX," more commonly known as Medicaid, provides 
substantial federal financial participation70 in state medical assis- 
tance programs. Medicaid is available in some form in virtually 
all states." Although federal regulations provide some overall 
consistency, states are allowed the flexibility necessary to admin- 
ister their specific medical assistance plans. Detailed regulations 
and eligibility requirements, therefore, tend to vary, within broad 
federal guidelines, from state to state.72 If a woman meets the 
eligibility requirements in her state,73 she can receive Medicaid 
payments to cover the medical expenses of pregnancy and child- 
birth. In addition, a child born to a Medicaid-eligible mother can 
receive health care assistance payments." Two of the components 
of funded adoption-maternity care and infant health care-are 
69. 42 U.S.C. $9 1396-1396k (1976). 
70. 42 U.S.C. 54 1396b, 1396d (1976), as amended by Social Security Act Amend- 
ments, Pub. L. No. 95-210, § 2, 91 Stat. 1485 (1977). 
71. Arizona's Medicaid program, scheduled to go into effect in mid-1977, was post- 
poned by failure on the part of the state legislature to appropriate the necessary funds. 
See Cochise County v. Dandoy, 116 Ariz. 53, 567 P.2d 1182 (1977). 
72. The federal statute lists general categories of medical assistance that must be 
provided in a qualified state plan. 42 U.S.C. §§  1396a(a)(13), 1396d(a) (1976), as amended 
by Social Security Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-210, § 2, 91 Stat. 1485 (1977). In 
addition, the federal statute has certain general requirements for eligibility, administra- 
tion, and other procedural aspects. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (1976). 
73. Under basic federal guidelines, eligible Medicaid recipients must be either 
"categorically needy" or "medically needy." See 42 U.S.C. $9 1396a(a)(10), 1396d(a) 
(1976); 42 C.F.R. § 435.1 (1978); STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT OF THE 
HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 9 5 ~ ~  CONG.,  ST SESS., DATA ON THE 
MEDICAID PROGRAM: ELIGIBILITY SERVICES, EXPENDITURES, FISCAL YEARS 1966-77, a t  1-2, 
23-25 (Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter cited as MEDICAID ATA]. "Categorically needy" 
includes individuals already receiving welfare aid under the federal AFDC (aid to families 
with dependent children) program, 42 U.S.C. § § 601-611 (1976), or individuals already 
receiving welfare aid under the federal SSI (supplemental security income-for the aged, . 
blind, or permanently disabled) program, 42 U.S.C. $ 8  1381-1383 (1976). See 42 C.F.R. $ 
435.4 (1978); MEDICAID ATA, supra, a t  1. "Medically needy" includes those who would 
be eligible for federal welfare (AFDC or SSI) but for failure to meet the low-income and 
resources requirements, yet who lack sufficient income and resources to pay for medical 
services. Medicaid coverage of the medically needy is optional with the state. See 42 
C.F.R. $ 435.4 (1978); MEDICAID DATA, supra, a t  1. Thus, generally speaking, Medicaid is 
only available to the aged, the blind, the permanently disabled, low-income families, or 
children under age 21. For a more comprehensive discussion of Medicaid eligibility, see 
Butler, The Medicaid Program: Current Statutory Requirements and Judicial 
Interpretations, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 7, 8-12 (1974). 
74. A child could be eligible either as a dependent of an AFDC family, or if the 
mother were not covered under AFDC, then as a child under 21 qualifying on the basis of 
financial need. See Butler, supra note 73, at 8-9. 
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thus .available, at least to some degree, through Medicaid pro- 
grams. 
Health care assistance as provided by Medicaid programs is 
a clear benefit to many pregnant women who might otherwise be 
financially unable to continue on to childbirth and adoptive 
placement of the child. However, a state's Medicaid eligibility 
requirements regarding age, income, or familial status may fore- 
close this benefit to other women who are under economic pres- 
sure to find an inexpensive means of resolving the problem of 
unwanted pregnancy. Many women technically ineligible for 
Medicaid may still be unable to readily afford the costs of child- 
birth and infant care, especially given the risk of expensive com- 
plications and the chance that the child may for some reason turn 
out to be difficult to place for adoption. These burdensome finan- 
cial risks may be so great as to make legal abortion, or the more 
desperate alternatives of illegal abortion or black market adop- 
tion, the only economically safe choices for many middle- and 
lower middle-income women. An additional disadvantage is that 
Medicaid is generally unavailable to single women over age 
t w e n t y - ~ n e . ~ ~  In a comprehensive funded adoption program, 
where eligibility requirements would be tailored to the goal of 
providing an abortion alternative for all women in financial need, 
ideally these particular gaps in coverage would not exist.?" 
2. Title XX of the Social Security Act-social services 
Title XXT7 is a flexible program that provides federal grants 
to states on a matching funds basis for a wide range of social 
servi~es.'~ Generally, title XX is intended to finance many ser- 
vices that may not be available through other programs like Med- 
i~a id . '~  Thus, if a particular state had no other program source 
for these expenses, title XX could fund nonmedical maternity 
75. See note 73 supra. Presumably, a large percentage of "unwanted pregnancies" 
occur among single women over age 21-exactly that group excluded from Medicaid 
coverage. 
76. For example, funded adoption eligibility could depend entirely on income and 
resources of applicants. Income and resources requirements could be set high enough that 
women who are not considered low-income level, yet who would be unable to assume the 
costs of childbirth (lower middle- and some middle-income level) would receive program 
benefits. Marital status and age would be irrelevant. 
77. 42 U.S.C. $5 1397-1397f (1976). 
78. See 42 U.S.C. § 1397 (1976); CHILD WWARE LEAGUE OF AMERICA, INC., USING CnTLE 
XX TO SERVE CHILDREN A D YOUTH 2-4 (1975) [hereinafter cited as USING TiTLE XX]. 
79. 42 U.S.C. § 1397a(a)(7)-(8), (lo), (12) (1976). See also 45 C.F.R. 88 228.40-.43 
(1978); USING TITLE XX, supra note 78, a t  12-16. 
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expenses, such as nutritional cares0 and routine child care,s1 as 
well as certain adoption costs.82 Particularly, title XX could pro- 
vide a valuable source of funding for adoption counseling and 
referral," and possibly even for direct adopt'.on subsidie~.~' Be- 
cause of its flexible structure, title XX is ideally suited as a 
possible source for many of the necessary funds not otherwise 
available to eligible womens5 seeking to place a child for adoption. 
3. Title IV-B of the Social Security Act-child welfare 
Title IV-Bs6 grants matching federal funds to state programs 
that provide basic child welfare services.87 Available under this 
title are funds for some adoption-related services, most notably 
counseling and referral and foster care services." Also, although 
this program is not designed to provide direct adoption subsidy, 
. it does cover most one-time adoption expenses," such as legal 
fees, if eligibility requirements are met." 
80. See 42 U.S.C. 8 1397a(a)(l) (1976); USING TITLE XX, supra note 78, a t  11, 43. 
81. See 42 U.S.C. § 1397a(a)(l) (1976); 45 C.F.R. § 228.42 (1978); USING TITLE XX, 
supra note 78, a t  10-11, 42. 
82. See 42 U.S.C. 9 1397a(a)(l) (1976); S. 961 Hearings, supra note 3, a t  29 (state- 
ment of Arabella Martinez, Assistant Secretary for Human Development, HEW); USING 
TITLE XX, supra note 78, at 21-22,42; Mott, Foster Care and Adoption: Some Key Policy 
Issues, in Opportunities for Adoption Act of 1977: Hearings on S. 961 Before the Sub- 
comm. on Child and Human Development of the Senate Comm. on Human Resources, 
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 447 (1977). 
83. See 42 U.S.C. § 1397a(a)(l) (1976); USING TITLE XX, supra note 78, at 21-22. 
84. See Note, The Implementation of Subsidized Adoption Programs: A Preliminary 
Study, 15 J .  FAM. L. 732, 748 n.46, 750 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Preliminary Study]. 
85. In general, eligibility for title XX services is based on income level or previous 
eligibility for other federal welfare programs. 42 U.S.C. 4 1397 a(a)(4), (5) (1976). Services 
may be extended to individuals with higher incomes upon payment of a fee "reasonably 
related to income." Id. § l397a(a)(6). See also 45 C.F.R. 0 0 228.60-$6 (1978) ; USING TITLE 
XX, supra note 78, a t  6-9. However, information or referral services, family planning 
services, and services directed a t  preventing child abuse or neglect are free to all income 
groups. 42 U.S.C. § 1397a(a)(6) (1976). 
86. 42 U.S.C. $8 620-626 (1976). 
87. See 42 U.S.C. $ 4  620, 625 (1976); 45 C.F.R. 4 220.62(d) (1978); Mott, supra note 
82, a t  477-78. 
88. See 42 U.S.C. § 625 (1976); 45 C.F.R. § 220.62(d) (1978); Mott, supra note 82, a t  
477-78. 
89. S. REP. NO. 573, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1977); Mott, supra note 82, a t  477. 
90. Generally, eligibility is based on need for child welfare services, with special 
consideration given to children and unmarried mothers for whom the state has assumed . 
public welfare responsibility. 45 C.F.R. 8 220.62(b) (1978). 
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4. Title V of the Social Security Act-maternal and child health 
care 
Title V," the Maternal and Child Health Care Act, gives 
annual allotments to the states to be used to promote the general 
improvements of maternal and child health.g2 Title V specifically 
funds maternity counseling services and health and nutrition in- 
formation centers? It  is also designed as a source of funding for 
child health care, especially for handicapped children.g4 Although 
limited in both scope and amount of federal funding, this pro- 
gram may be useful in filling gaps not covered by other state 
programs. 
5. Title X of the Public Health Service Act-family planning 
Title Xg5 grants federal funds to both state and private non- 
profit organizations that provide family planning services." Al- 
though these programs are generally oriented toward prevention 
of unwanted pregnancy, they nevertheless could be expanded to 
provide adoption-oriented counseling that directed women to 
adoption benefits from collateral state and federal programs." 
Perhaps the major significance of title X in this respect is that 
its services are generally available without regard to income or 
other eligibility factors. g8 
B. Adoption Subsidy Laws 
1 .  Existing state programs-subsidized adoption 
Over forty states have statutes that can be termed "adoption 
91. 42 U.S.C. $8 701-716 (1976). 
92. See 42 U.S.C. Q$ 701, 705(a)(6)-(14), 708-710 (1976), as amended by Health 
Services Extension Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-83, $309(a), 91 Stat. 383 (1977); 42 C.F.R. 
99 5la.lOlCj), .128-.I32 (1978). 
93. See 42 U.S.C. §$ 705(a)(8), (12), (14), 708 (1976); 42 C.F.R. §§  51a.l01Cj), .I28 
(1978). 
94. See 42 U.S.C. 44 705(a)(5)-(7), (9)-(lo), (12)-(13), 709-710 (1976); 42 C.F.R. $ 8  
5la.lOlCj)-(k), .129-.I32 (1978). 
95. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300 to 300a-8 (1976). 
96. 42 U.S.C. $8 300, 300a (1976); 42 C.F.R. 8 59.5(b)-Cj) (1978). 
97. This redirection of counseling and referral is legislatively proposed by S. 2614, 
supra note 56. However, there is apparently nothing in the present statute that would 
disallow minor administrative readjustments of counseling and referral emphasis to in- 
clude adoption counseling. Cf. 42 C.F.R. $ 59.5(e), (i) (1978) (provision for refenal to and 
coordination with other social and medical services agencies providing family planning 
services). 
98. However, services are free only to low-income individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-4(c) 
(1976); 42 C.F.R. 88 59.2(e), .5(a)(4)-(5) (1978). 
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subsidy l a ~ s . " ~ ~ l t h o u g h  the details of the different laws vary 
greatly, all share a similar purpose-to facilitate placement of all 
children in need of adoption by increasing the number of suitable 
adoptive homes. loo 
The adoption subsidy concept is fairly simple. Subsidy pay- 
ments are made out of public funds to the adoptive parents for 
the full or partial support of the adopted child.lOl The legal status 
of the child is not in any way affected by the subsidy.'" The 
subsidy is not an award or incentive to adopt.lo3 The assistance 
is meant only to promote placement of the child into a loving, 
stable home in cases where the financial situation of the adoptive 
parents would not otherwise permit the adoption. Financial in- 
ability to adopt can arise either because the income of the parents 
is insufficient to support the normal expenses of childrearing or 
because special needs of the child, such as a physical handicap 
' requiring expensive medical care, demand more than the poten- 
tial parents' otherwise adequate income can provide. In either 
case, the goal is to ensure that all children, regardless of financial 
factors, will find adoptive homes. 
As mentioned, the specific aspects of state adoption subsidy 
programs vary. Commonly, however, states provide assistance for 
both normal maintenance and medical costs.lo4 Eligibility re- 
quirements in many states insist that the child be "hard to 
place"lo5 and already eligible for assistance under other public 
programs.106 Assistance is generally administered in the form of 
direct payments to the adoptive parents, who are contractually 
obligated to use the subsidies for specific support expenses.ln 
Subsidies can also take the form of a continuation of previous 
99. Katz, Subsidized Adoption in America, 10 Fa. L.Q. 1,7 (1976). For a listing and 
description of most of these state adoption subsidy laws, see S. 961 Hearings, supra note 
3, a t  341-52 (report of Jean Yavis Jones, Education and Public Welfare Division, Congres- 
sional Research Service, Library of Congress). See also id. at  20 (statement of ~ r a b e l l a  
Martinez, Assistant Secretary for Human Development, HEW). 
100. See, e.g., S. 961, supra note 18, § 101 (Findings and Declaration of Purpose); S. 
REP. NO. 95-167, supra note 19, a t  21; Katz, supra note 99, a t  7. 
101. See generally MCNAMARA, supra note 27, a t  111-13; Katz, supra note 99, at 4. 
102. Katz, supra note 99, a t  6. 
103. Id. 
104. See S. 961 Hearings, supra note 3, a t  339 (Jones research report); Preliminary 
Study, supra note 84, at 739. For studies comparing the provisions of various state adop- 
tion subsidy laws, see S. 961 Hearings, supra note 3, a t  353-60. 
105. S. 961 Hearings, supra note 3, a t  339 (Jones research report); Preliminary Study, 
supra note 84, at 738. 
106. Preliminary Study, supra note 84, at  738. 
107. See, e.g., Katz, supra note 99, a t  39-41. 
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assistance payments for which the child was eligible, notably 
Medicaid. loS 
Adoption subsidy, as presently administered by the states, 
focuses on placement of children with special needs, children who 
may have been in foster care or institutional care for some time, 
even for years.lo9 The focus generally has not been directed toward 
cases where mothers are hoping to place newborn children for 
immediate adoption. However, there is no reason that subsidy 
payments cannot be provided in this situation as well. Normally, 
placing a newborn infant is not difficult, and therefore subsidies 
would not be needed. But in those few cases where the infant is 
hard-to-place, for whatever reason, adoption subsidy can ensure 
placement, perhaps by allowing more low-income minority fami- 
lies to become eligible to adopt a minority child, or by making it 
possible for a concerned and able couple to adopt a child with a 
costly medical handicap in spite of their modest income. 
2. The Model Act-impetus and example 
A Model State Subsidized Adoption Act has been drafted? 
This Model Act encourages appropriate adoption by supplement- 
ing state adoption programs with a public financial adoption sub- 
sidy program.lll The Model Act generally focuses on the financial 
needs of the child, rather than the financial status of the par- 
ents.l12 A wide range of "special needs" will qualify a child for 
assistance.l13 However, built into the Act is a requirement that a 
full attempt to place the child without the subsidy be made be- 
fore payments will be authorized.ll4 Additionally, as is the case 
in most states, the Model Act contemplates a contractual ar- 
rangement with the adoptive parents before they can receive the 
payments. 115 
Many states now have provisions similar in some respects to 
those of the Model Act, but it seems likely that unless some 
leadership a t  the federal level encourages the states to meet uni- 
108. See 42 C.F.R. $436.222 (1978); S .  REP. NO. 573,95th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1977); 
Preliminary Study, supra note 84, at 744 n.40. 
109. See generally S. 961 Hearings, supra note 3, at 339-40 (Jones research report); 
Katz, supra note 99, at 3-7; Preliminary Study, supra note 84, at 737-39. 
110. See Katz, supra note 99, at 7-16. 
111. Id. at 11. (MODEL STATE SUBSIDIZED ADOFTION A m  8 1). 
112. Id. at 8, 13-14 (MODEL STATE SUBSIDIZED ADOPTION ACT $ 4). 
113. Id. at 8, 11-12 (MODEL STATE SUBSIDIZED ADOFTION A m  $ 2). 
114. Id. at 8, 13-14 (MODEL STATE SUBSIDIZED ADOPTION ACT 9 4). 
115. Id. at 8, 14-15 (MODEL STATE SUBSIDIZED ADOPTION A m  $ 5). 
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form guidelines, such as those of the Model Act, the present wide 
array of differing state adoption subsidy laws will continue. A 
federally established adoption subsidy plan, patterned after the 
Model Act and enacted as part of a funded adoption program, 
could serve to bring about uniformity merely by making funds 
available to those state plans that conform to federal standards. 
C. Federal Benefits and State Subsidies Corn bined 
In many states, a creative social services organization may 
presently be able to package individual abortion alternative 
plans. By carefully combining the benefits available under the 
various existing federal assistance programs with benefits from 
state adoption subsidy plans, an organization could put together 
assistance plans that, in individual cases, may provide most of 
. the major advantages of funded adoption. In some cases, limited 
state assistance can be supplemented with assistance from chari- 
table organizations, which often have established programs that 
are of great benefit to unwed mothers.l16 Nevertheless, all of these 
possibilities require an individual approach and may not be ade- 
quate for every woman in need of funded adoption services, sim- 
ply because complete assistance may be impossible to piece to- 
gether in every case. 
A comprehensive funded adoption program need not be ad- 
ministered on an assembly line basis, oblivious to individual situ- 
ations. However, the uniform nature and availability of all the 
components of assistance within a single, understandable, feder- 
ally supported program would discourage inequality of adminis- 
tration. By comparison, the piecing together necessary to provide 
full assistance under existing programs seems an unwieldy and 
confusing process, perhaps not worth the effort of a woman totally 
discouraged by the complexity of social services administration. 
This Comment has urged the legislative enactment of funded 
adoption from a removed perspective, as if legislators would inev-8 
itably be impressed with the proposal to the point that further 
justification would be unnecessary. Obviously, the situation is 
more complex. Congress and state legislatures must weigh the 
116. See, e.g., Searle, Adoption Program Aids Mother, Child (1973) (pamphlet avail- 
able from The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Social Services Dep't, Salt 
Lake City, Utah). 
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benefits of providing this essential service against potential dis- 
advantages such as excessive cost and implementation difficul- 
ties, taking into consideration the competing interests of the var- 
ious constituent groups that might favor or oppose funded adop- 
tion. Duplication of legislation must be avoided by a review of 
existing programs. Overall policy must be examined and debated. 
Although all competing viewpoints on the important issues in this 
legislative balancing process cannot be discussed adequately 
here, certain areas of likely difference of opinion should be men- 
tioned. These are the broad issues of cost, implementation, and 
constitutionality. 
A. Cost 
Perhaps the most formidable barrier to any new social legis- 
lation is cost. Taxpayers and legislators alike are concerned with 
whether the proposed program will prove worthwhile, or merely 
wasteful. The worry is whether it will succumb to the chronic and 
costly ills of bloated budget and spending waste, or whether the 
new program will deliver in a cost-conservative manner services 
that are imperatively needed. 
A budget report is neither attempted nor feasible in this 
Comment, but it should be noted that much of the money neces- 
sary for funded adoption is already being spent for similar ser- 
vices. All of the various components of the program-counseling 
and referral, maternity care, infant care, and adoption sub- 
sidy-presently exist, although in separate programs, either a t  
the federal or state level.lL7 If these disjointed efforts were simply 
consolidated into a single program, total cost could conceivably 
decrease. Indeed, it has been estimated that a redirection of em- 
phasis would result either in no extra cost or a budget cut in the 
areas of adoption subsidylls and counseling and referral.llg 
Nevertheless, total optimism may be inappropriate. It seems 
likely that even though a comprehensive funded adoption pro- 
gram may be a more efficient use of money already being spent 
117. See Section IV-C supra. 
118. S. REP. NO. 573, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 115 (1977) (Senate Comm. on Finance 
estimates on adoption assistance costs under H.R. 7200); id. a t  123-25 (Congressional 
Budget Office estimates on adoption assistance costs under H.R. 7200). These estimates 
assume that adoption subsidy costs will be offset by funds that would otherwise go to 
foster care payments. 
119. Emphasizing adoption and other abortion alternatives, instead of abortion, 
should not result in increased counseling time or costs. See 124 CONG. REC. S2652 (daily 
ed. Mar. 1, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Helms). 
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for similar services, the eventual cost of administeriqg the pro- 
gram so as to actually fulfill its purpose-provision of an abortion 
alternative-would increase above present budget levels. Simply 
by becoming an attractive alternative, the program would en- 
courage more women to make use of the available assistance, 
women who might otherwise not avail themselves of public funds 
for these special needs. On the other hand, by shunting children 
who would normally be expected to become part of welfare- 
eligible families out of the welfare system and into adoptive 
homes, where some if not all the cost of their support could be 
borne by the adoptive parents, arguably the public would ulti- 
mately save a great deal of social welfare money.120 
Whichever view is taken, funded adoption clearly would 
demand a large budget.121 Whether this budget can be built up 
by reallocating present, less efficient funding, or whether new 
resources will need to be tapped, is a question answerable only 
after extensive study. In any case, the vital need for this program 
should prove sufficient to motivate sponsoring members of Con- 
gress and state legislatures to devise creative and efficient propos- 
als to meet the expenses of funded adoption. 
B. Implementation 
A complete, integrated funded adoption program should not 
present insurmountable problems of implementation. A perva- 
sive framework that provides all facets of social welfare services 
has existed for decades a t  both state and federal levels. The 
wealth of experience of federal and state administrative entities 
in this area will prove useful in building a new system for delivery 
of the funded adoption benefits. Since the major target group of 
funded adoption services will be women or families already ac- 
quainted with social services administration, there should be no 
real difficulty in establishing early awareness of the benefits of 
the new program. However, to ensure the effectiveness resulting 
from the comprehensive nature of the program, which is its major 
advantage over the present disjointed system, full implementa- 
120. Opponents of federal or state cutoffs of Medicaid funding of elective abortion 
also argue that future welfare rolls must be kept free of unwanted welfare children. See 
Lincoln, supra note 11, a t  214; 123 CONC. REC. E4940 (daily ed. July 28, 1977) (remarks 
of Rep. Edwards). 
121. Depending on eligibility requirements, the overall budget could be expanded or 
contracted. If all women, regardless of economic need, were eligible for part or all of' the 
funded adoption services, see Section II-E supra, the total cost would be significantly 
greater than if benefits were limited to needy women. 
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tion should be a primary goal of administrative personnel. Piece- 
meal implementation merely postpones this effectiveness. 
Duplication of services could be another barrier to smooth 
implementation. However, a legislative and administrative re- 
view of present programs may obviate this problem. Also, a well- 
organized counseling network, which is the first contact point for 
those using the program, would be a practical guard against most 
instances of duplication, and the confusion and budget waste that 
result. 
C. Constitutionality 
The constitutionality of funded adoption, as a specifically 
intended alternative to elective abortion, has of course not been 
tested in the courts. Nevertheless, a conscientious legislator will 
be concerned about the constitutional implications of funded 
adoption legislation, particularly those stemming from the equal 
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The major con- 
cern is whether a state, partaking of federal monies, may favor 
mothers who choose normal childbirth and adoption over those 
who prefer to terminate pregnancy through abortion by providing 
economic assistance in a funded adoption program. This question 
is especially pertinent where a state has refused to fund elective 
abortion. 122 
Although this issue has not been litigated in the context of 
funded adoption, it has been considered by the courts in the 
related area of funded abortion. The Supreme Court in Maher v. 
was faced with the almost identical question of whether the 
equal protection clause prohibits a state from refusing to pay for 
nontherapeutic abortions for indigent women, while continuing to 
provide assistance to eligible mothers carrying their children to 
term.124 The lower court had overturned a state regulation that 
restricted Medicaid assistance for abortions to those found to be 
"medically necessary"125 on the ground that such restrictions were 
not "equally applicable to medicaid payments for childbirth."lZ6 
122. See note 7-10 and accompanying text supra. 
123. 432 U.S. 464 (1977). The companion cases to Maher were Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 
438 (1977) (state regulation prohibiting Medicaid payments for nontherapeutic abortions 
not a contravention of title XIX of Social Security Act, the Medicaid statute) and Poelker 
v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977) (refusal of city to provide nontherapeutic abortions in publicly 
financed hospital not unconstitutional). 
124. 432 U.S. at 468-69. 
125. Id. at 466 & n.2. 
126. Roe v. Norton, 408 F. Supp. 660, 665 (D. Conn. 1975), reu'd sub nom. Maher v. 
Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). 
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Justice Powell, writing for the majority,127 found that the 
challenged Connecticut regulation did not violate the fourteenth 
amendment's equal protection clause.lB In analyzing the equal 
protection issue, the Court applied the usual two-tiered test.I2W' 
either a suspect classification or an infringement of a fundamen- 
tal right is found, then the state must demonstrate a compelling 
state interest that outweighs the negative effects of the classifica- 
tion scheme in order to overcome the constitutional challenge. If 
there is no suspect classification or infringement of a fundamen- 
tal right, then the state's classification scheme must merely be 
"rationally related" to a legitimate state interest.130 
The challengers in Maher pointed out that the Connecticut 
regulation classified pregnant women into two groups-those who 
preferred to give birth normally and those who chose to abort. 
The classification scheme, they argued, both discriminated 
against the latter group of women in violation of equal protection 
of the law and unduly interfered with their right, recognized in 
127. The decision was six to three. Justice Brennan, in his dissent, criticized the 
majority for ignoring the due process considerations. He argued that the denial of elective 
abortion Medicaid assistance was a direct infringement of an indigent woman's privacy 
right to obtain an abortion. 432 U.S. at 484-85 (Brennan, J., dissenting). According to Roe 
v. Wade, Justice Brennan pointed out, this right is rooted in the due process clause. See 
id. However, even assuming the validity of Justice Brennan's criticism of the Maher 
result, it would be inapplicable in the funded adoption situation, where the concern is not 
whether the state is infringing a poor woman's right to abort by denying needed financial 
assistance. Rather, the separate concern is whether the state may financially favor 
alternatives to abortion. 
Justice Marshall and Justice Blackmun each wrote a separate dissenting opinion 
applicable to all three companion cases. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438,454-63 (1977). Justice 
Marshall once again advocated implementation of his "sliding scale" approach to equal 
protection adjudication. 432 U.S. a t  457-58 (1977)(Marshall, J., dissenting). See generally 
Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a 
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 17-18 (1972). 
None of the other justices joined in Marshall's dissent. 
Justice Blackmun drew attention to the human elements involved in the Maher 
result, pointing out that for many poor women the holding of the Court signifies the 
destruction of the only reasonable solution to unwanted pregnancy. 432 U.S. a t  462 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Funded adoption, as advocated by this Comment, would 
provide another answer for these women. 
128. 432 U.S. a t  470. For a more complete analysis of the holding of the Court, see 
Hardy, Privacy and Public Funding: Maher v. Roe as the Interaction of Roe v. Wade and 
Dandridge v. Williams, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 903 (1976); Comment, State Funding of Elective 
Abortion: The Supreme Court Defers to the Legislature, 46 U .  CIN. L. REV. 1003 (1977). 
129. 432 US.  a t  470 (citing San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 
(1973)). For a comprehensive analysis of the two-tiered approach to equal protection, and 
the trends toward a "newer" equal protection, see Gunther, supra note 127. 
130. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976); San 
Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973). 
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Roe v. Wade, 131 to choose an elective ab0rti0n.l~~ The challengers 
contended that because of the nature of the right involved, the 
heavy burden of showing a compelling state interest should fall 
upon the state-a burden that Connecticut would not be able to 
carry.lS The Supreme Court, however, found Connecticut's clas- 
sification scheme not "suspect," and therefore did not require the 
state to show a compelling state interest.'" The Court held that 
even though a fundamental right of privacy was involved, this 
right was not infringed by the state scheme.135 The Court empha- 
sized that Roe v. Wade and other right of privacy cases had not 
established an absolute constitutional right to an abortion, as the 
challengers had argued. Rather, the cases held that a state may 
not establish an "unduly burdensome interference" with a 
woman's decision to abort Connecticut's regulation was an 
encouragement of childbirth, not an absolute or undue barrier to 
ab0rti0n.l~~ Therefore, the deferential rational basis test, rather 
than the compelling state interest test, was proper.13" 
Alternatively, argued the challengers, the state regulation 
could not stand even under the rational basis test. Connecticut's 
assertion that prohibiting elective abortion payments furthered 
the state's interest in conserving public funds was characterized 
as "wholly chimerical."139 The Court, however, emphasized a fur- 
ther legitimate purpose for the regulation-a strong state interest 
in encouraging childbirth?" This purpose, "an interest honored 
131. 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973). 
132. See 432 U.S. at 470; Brief for Appellee at 15-16, 18, Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 
(1977). 
133. Brief for Appellee at 21, 33, Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). 
134. 432 U.S. a t  470-71 (citing San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29 
(1973); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970)). 
135. Id. a t  471-74. 
136. Id. a t  474. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. at 477-78. The test, as articulated by the Court, required that the state's 
classification scheme be " 'rationally related' to a 'constitutionally permissible7 purpose." 
Id. a t  478 (quoting Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972)). 
139. Brief for Appellee a t  27, Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (quoting the trial 
court, Roe v. Norton, 408 F. Supp. 660, 664 (D. Conn. 1975)). See id. a t  28, 33-34. For a 
better argument than Connecticut's that a state will save money by refusing to fund 
elective abortions, see Hardy, supra note 128, a t  924-32. 
140. 432 U.S. a t  478-79. In a footnote the Court also suggested that a state's 
"legitimate demographic concerns about its rate of population growth" may be a further 
legitimate state purpose. Id. a t  478 n.11. Neither the interests in encouraging childbirth 
nor the interests in population growth rate were raised by the parties. The interests in 
state finances and maternal health were the only state purposes mentioned by the lower 
court. Roe v. Norton, 408 F. Supp. 660, 664 & n.4 (D. Conn. 1975). 
Possibly, the state did not urge "encouraging childbirth" as its purpose because this 
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over the centuries, ""I was legitimate and rationally furthered by 
making Medicaid funds available for childbirth costs while deny- 
ing payments for elective ab0rti0ns.l~~ Although the Court did not 
directly so state, the concept that discouraging abortions also 
furthers the state policy of encouraging childbirth is inherent in 
the ana1y~is.l~~ Finally, the Court noted in upholding the Con- 
necticut regulation that states are accorded a "wider latitude in 
choosing among competing demands for limited public funds"Id4 
and that sensitive policy decisions involved in this area are most 
appropriately reserved to the legislative branch.141 
The constitutional issues involved in a state's enactment of 
funded adoption can be resolved using the analysis of the Maher 
Court. In the funded adoption situation, the right of a woman to 
have an elective abortion would be no more infringed than in the 
Maher situation, and the compelling state interest test would be 
inappropriate. In the absence of state funding of abortion, the 
fact that poor women would be encouraged, in an economic sense, 
to avail themselves of the adoption alternative does not violate 
any fundamental right. As Justice Powell pointed out in Maher, 
that the state "may have made childbirth a more attractive alter- 
native, thereby influencing the woman's decision, . . . 
impose[s] no restriction on access to abortions that was not al- 
ready there."14VI'he economic condition that may foreclose elec- 
tive abortion is "neither created nor in any way affected"147 by a 
funded adoption program. 
Funded adoption passes scrutiny under the less demanding 
interest seemed so similar to the state interest in the protection of the unborn child, an 
interest that became sufficiently compelling to overcome the woman's right to decide on 
abortion only after the stage of viability, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. a t  163-64. However, the 
Court in Maher found this state interest in "protecting the potential life of the fetus" to  
be the source of the interest in encouraging childbirth. 432 US.  a t  478; Beal v. Doe, 432 
U.S. 438, 445-56 (1977). 
141. 432 U.S. a t  478 (footnote omitted). 
142. Id. a t  478-79. 
143. Perhaps the Court shied away from this concept because its rationale for allow- 
ing minimal scrutiny depended on a showing of noninterference by the state with the 
woman's right to terminate her pregnancy. Justice Powell noted that encouragement of 
childbirth was no obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion. 432 U S .  a t  474-75. However, 
positive discouragement of the exercise of that right seems slightly more suggestive of 
"direct state interference with a protected activity," id. a t  475. See also, Note, State 
Funding of Nontherapeutic Abortions, Medicaid Plans, Equal Protection, Right to Choose 
an Abortion, 11 AKRON L. REV. 345, 354 (1977). 
144. 432 U.S. a t  479 (footnote omitted). 
145. Id. at 479-80. 
146. Id. a t  474. 
147. Id. 
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test of rationality because the same legitimate state interest, en- 
couraging normal childbirth, is a t  stake. By funding the expenses 
of pregnancy, delivery, child care, and adoption, the state ration- 
ally attempts to further this strong interest. This particular 
means is at least as effective as simply cutting off abortion assis- 
tance. By establishing an economically attractive alternative to 
abortion, the state not only encourages those who would choose 
adoption anyway, but also those who might otherwise resort to 
abortion, to take advantage of the state program, thereby increas- 
ing the number of live births in comparison to the number of 
abortions. 
Funded adoption, under the principles stated by the Su- 
preme Court in Maher v. Roe, would in no way violate the four- 
teenth amendment guarantee of equal protection. Even though 
the arguments of those preferring not to favor childbirth and 
adoption over elective abortion are entitled to full consideration 
by a legislature, in the end these arguments fail as constitutional 
objections; they become instead policy arguments to be weighed 
in the legislative balancing process against the many policy fac- 
tors in favor of providing a much needed alternative to elective 
abortion. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Two complex factors have combined to limit the alternatives 
available to women with unwanted pregnancies. First, economic 
pressure from high costs of pregnancy and childbirth, most severe 
in the case of indigent women, pushes forcefully toward the less 
expensive alternative of abortion. In some cases, especially after 
the recent cutoff of federal and most state funding of elective 
abortion, the cost of private abortion itself may increase the pres- 
sure, leaving many women with no economically feasible choices 
other than illegal, "back alley" abortion or black market adop- 
tion. Second, public institutions and modern society itself tend 
to urge the simple and expedient solution-abortion-over the 
complex and lengthy process of childbirth and adoption. The 
women most affected by these two factors in combination are 
those who are morally opposed to elective abortion, yet who are 
economically disadvantaged to the degree that acceptable alter- 
natives are nonexistent. 
Funded adoption is an escape from this cul-de-sac of the 
conscience. Such a program, enacted at the federal level and 
administered by states on a matching-funds basis, would provide 
(1) counseling and referral services; (2) assistance payments for 
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costs of pregnancy, childbirth, and postpartum care to eligible 
women; (3) maintenance and medical care for the newborn in- 
fant; and (4) adoption expenses, to include direct subsidies to 
potential adoptive parents, if necessary to facilitate prompt adop- 
tion of handicapped, minority, or other hard-to-place infants. By 
removing the economic obstacles to the adoption alternative and 
by ensuring prompt and appropriate placement of the child, 
funded adoption will serve as the much needed alternative for 
many women. 
Congress has not been insensitive to the need for abortion 
alternatives. The Adoption Reform Act of 1978, as well as several 
bills introduced in the 95th Congress, have evidenced the concern 
of many members of Congress. However, a complete program of 
funded adoption has yet to be approved. Other programs, such 
as Medicaid and title XX of the Social Security Act, when grafted 
onto state adoption subsidy programs already in existence in 
most states, provide makeshift solutions resembling the funded 
adoption concept. But these efforts must be carried out on an 
.individual case basis, often a t  added expense, confusion, and 
frustration to both the government agencies and the women they 
are trying to assist. 
A comprehensive funded adoption program, if enacted, 
would not be immune from the normal problems of cost and 
implementation. However, well-planned legislation and high- 
quality administration of the program could minimize these 
problems. Also, a conscientious legislator's concerns about the 
constitutional implications of a program that tends to favor child- 
birth over abortion should be assuaged by the recent Supreme 
Court decision in Maher v. Roe, which held that a state can 
constitutionally refuse to fund elective abortion while continuing 
to pay for childbirth expenses under Medicaid. The equal protec- 
tion issue in a funded adoption program is nearly identical. A 
legislator can be confident that funded adoption does not violate 
the fourteenth amendment. On the contrary, funded adoption 
offers its own "equal protection"-a protection that shields those 
women who are willing to accept the necessary travail in hopes 
of gaining the luxury of a triumph of conscience over severe eco- 
nomic and social pressure to abort. In an abortion-conscious so- 
ciety, this rare triumph deserves respect. 
Frederick R. Vandeveer 
